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  Executive Summary 
 
Globalization is the defining historical process of our times, conditioning, if not determining, 
outcomes across vast swathes of human activity. At the same time, a heteropolar world is 
emerging, one in which various and competing sources of power and influence are based more 
on difference than on similarity. In the face of these transformative forces, diplomacy is 
struggling to evolve. To date, none of the key elements of the diplomatic ecosystem – the foreign 
ministry, the Foreign Service, or the diplomatic business model – have adapted well, or quickly 
enough. If diplomacy is to achieve its full potential as a non-violent approach to the 
management of international relations and global issues through political communications, then 
radical reform will be required. 
  
These observations are particularly apt in Canada, where diplomatic performance has in recent 
years been troubled. The foreign ministry (formerly DFAIT), still struggling to absorb the deep 
cuts contained in the federal budget of March 2012, finds itself in the midst of a complicated  
merger with the aid agency (formerly CIDA). This unanticipated amalgamation has resulted in 
significant uncertainty and dislocation in both organizations, and is reminiscent of the 
disastrous split, and then re-integration, of the foreign and trade ministries 2004-06. Canadian 
public and digital diplomacy, widely considered to represent the leading edge of diplomatic 
practice, have been wound down as a result of the imposition of centralized control over all 
communications. The Foreign Service, for its part, remains locked in a protracted and 
acrimonious labour dispute over pay equity. Rotating strikes and working to rule have taken a 
toll on business and tourist arrivals, foreign student enrolment and high-level visits.  
In short, Canada’s diplomatic ecosystem is in a perilous state, and Canadian interests are 
suffering. In the age of globalization and heteropolarity, this won’t do. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Executive Summary 
 
The Arctic sea-ice is in a state of rapid decline. Barriers to navigation that once doomed the likes 
of Sir John Franklin and closed the shortcut to the Orient now seem to be melting away. The 
prospect of shorter, transpolar transportation routes linking Asian and Western markets has 
inspired excitement and fear, and particularly the latter when it comes to Canadian sovereignty.  
 
This paper confirms recent studies suggesting that, in spite of the general trend towards reduced 
ice cover in the Arctic Basin, environmental variability, scarce infrastructure and other 
navigational aids, and uncertain economics make it unlikely that the Northwest Passage will 
emerge as a viable trans-shipping route in the foreseeable future. Instead, the region is likely to 
witness a steady increase in resource, resupply, and tourist destinational shipping. Accordingly, 
concerns that this increased activity will adversely affect Canadian sovereignty are misplaced. 
Rather than calling into question Canadian control, foreign vessels engaged in local activities are 
likely to reinforce Canada’s legal position by demonstrating an international acceptance of 
Canadian laws and regulations. 
 
Rather than worrying about the “sovereignty” ramifications of Arctic shipping, the Canadian 
government should focus its short – and medium – term energies on the practical requirements 
of developing and maintaining safe shipping routes. At the heart of this requirement is ensuring 
that such activity is beneficial to Inuit, whose traditional “highways” will double as transits 
routes for resource carriers and cruise liners. If developed with an eye to those most directly 
affected, Canada’s Arctic waters can become a well-managed route to an increasingly attractive 
region, making our Arctic a destination rather than mere space through which to pass. 
 
 
 
 
 
La mond alis tion est le proc ssus historique qui définit le mieux notre époque t qui conditionn ,
u même détermine l’issue d  vastes secte rs de l’activité humaine. Parallèleme t, un mond
hétéropolaire émerge, dans equel des sources variées de pouvoir et ’influence s’affrontent
et mettent davantage l’accent sur leurs différences que sur leurs similitudes. En regard de ces 
forces de transformation, la diplomatie s’efforce d’évoluer. À ce jour, aucun des éléments clés de 
l’écosystème diplomatique – les affaires étrangères, le service extérieur ou le modèle diplomatique 
– n’a su s’adapter correctement ou assez rapidement. Si la diplomatie doit servir d’outil pleinement 
valable pour une approche non violente des relations internationales et des affaires de la planète en 
tablant sur des communications politiques efficaces, une réforme en profondeur s’impose.
Ces observations se vérifient en particulier au Canada où depuis quelques années, la diplomatie 
connaît des difficultés. Le ministère des Affaires étrangères (anciennement le MAECI) qui lutte 
encore pour composer avec les compressions draconiennes contenues dans le budget fédéral 
de mars 2012 se retrouve au centre d’une fusion compliquée avec l’Agence de développement 
(ACDI). Cette fusion imprévue a engendré passablement d’incertitudes et des bouleversements 
dans les deux organisations, ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler la séparation désastreuse du ministère 
des Affaires étrangères et du ministère du Commerce, suivie de leur réintégration (2004-2006). 
La diplomatie publique et numérique canadienne, largement considérée comme un modèle du 
genre dans la pratique diplomatique, n’existe plus depuis qu’on a imposé le contrôle centralisé de 
toutes les communicatio s. Pour leurs parts, les Affaires étrangères sont enferrées dans un conflit 
de travail acerbe à propos de l’équité alariale. Des grèves tournantes et la grève du zèle ont nui 
ux affaires et aux a rivées d  touristes, à l’inscription d’étu iants é rangers ain i qu’aux visites 
officielles.
En somme, l’écosystème diplomatique du Canada est en piteux état et les intérêts du pays en 
souffrent. À l’ère de la mondialisation et de l’hétéropolarité, cette situation est inacceptable.
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Diplomacy, Globalization and Heteropolarity: 
The Challenge of Adaptation 
 
he world is beset by daunting, seemingly intractable problems, ranging from political 
violence and religious extremism to climate change, environmental collapse, food 
deficits and pandemic disease. Many citizens, alarmed by the declining quality of their 
lives, have become cynical and dismayed as the downward spiral accelerates. National 
governments, frequently captured by special interests and trapped in old ways of operating, have 
failed to defend the public interest. Bereft of creative alternatives, the first instinct of many 
decision makers has been to reach for the gun when faced with trouble. Fears have been 
conjured and insecurity instilled; rights and freedoms have been circumscribed and inequality is 
on the rise.1 
There is, however, another way forward. The alternative to militarization proceeds from the 
observation that because long-term, equitable and sustainable development has become the 
basis for security in the age of globalization, diplomacy must replace defence at the centre of 
international policy.2  
Diplomacy, however marginalized and misunderstood, warrants a closer look.3 Today it matters 
more than ever, but diplomacy in most OECD countries is in serious disrepair. Rigid, 
disconnected and convention-ridden, the world’s second oldest profession is underperforming 
and faces a crisis of relevance and effectiveness, related mainly to its inability to change and 
adapt. In part as a result, diplomacy’s brand is decidedly negative, associated mainly with 
weakness, appeasement and caving in to power.  
Like the cartoon caricatures of dandies and dames in pin stripes and pearls, both the image and 
the archetypes are inaccurate. More crucially, diplomacy’s deficiencies can be remedied. They 
have to be. The most profound threats facing the planet are not amenable to military solutions.  
Bottom line? Security is not a martial art. Defence is about armed force, while diplomacy is 
about persuasion and influence. The military is both too sharp, and too dull a policy instrument 
to treat the vexing transnational issues that afflict us all. Hunger and poverty are not amenable 
to the application of hard power; they cannot be defeated by expeditionary interventions, drone 
strikes or special operations. 
To better understand how diplomacy can address the issues inherent in the emerging 
heteropolar world, a “whirled” view is essential. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 An outstanding three part documentary film treatment of this theme is offered by Adam Curtis in The Power of 
Nightmares (BBC, 2004). See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Power_of_Nightmares. In the case of the USA, it 
can be argued that since 9/11, policy has become an instrument of war. See Hew Strachan, “Strategy and the 
Limitation of War”, Survival, 50:1, 2008. Available at: http://www.iiss.org/en/publications/survival/sections/2008-
4e2e/survival--global-politics-and-strategy-february-march-2008-4b1e/50-1-06-strachan-3555 . On the domestic 
costs associated with the Global War on Terror, see ACLU, National Security, available at: 
http://www.aclu.org/national-security.    
2 For a full elaboration of this argument, see Daryl Copeland, Guerrilla Diplomacy: Rethinking International 
Relations (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2009). Read the Introduction. 
3 A comprehensive survey is found in Andrew Cooper et.al., The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy (Oxford: 
Oxford UP, 2013). 
T 
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GLOBALIZATION RULES 
Globalization is a complex and totalizing force.4 Intimately related to neoliberalism, it finds 
expression in deregulation, integrated markets, financial and monetary interdependence and 
increased levels of trade and investment, travel and migration.  
 
Globalization compresses space and accelerates time. Powered by the revolution in information 
and communication technologies, and featuring ever-rising levels of digital connectivity, the 
Internet is its flagship.  
Globalization is a driver of economic integration and cultural homogenization, but it socializes 
costs while privatizing benefits. Globalization generates wealth and productive efficiencies, but 
not for all. Inherently unstable, it polarizes at all levels, producing winners and losers, social 
ferment and political fragmentation. Among those who find themselves on the downside, these 
consequences can generate anger, anxiety and resentment.  
Globalization cuts all ways. In less than a generation, it has erased many of the features that had 
defined world order in the wake of World War II.  The Cold War era’s division of the globe into a 
more or less static set of First (industrialized, market democracies aligned with the USA), 
Second (industrialized, “socialist” political economies aligned with the USSR) and Third (less 
developed commodity exporters of various political orientation) World countries has given way 
to a much more messy, complicated and dynamic mix.  
Cold War comfort has been replaced by something far less predictable.   
HETEROPOLIS RISING 
For the past few hundred years, high-level statecraft has been mainly concerned with attempts 
at balancing power.  From the age of European empires through to the end of the Cold War, the 
statistical vectors of national power – armies, navies, missiles, warheads, economies, 
populations, territories – were carefully calculated and measured, and then balanced and 
formally or informally codified in an attempt to engineer stability. Numbers were important; 
alliances were made and treaties entered into for purposes of expressing or extending agreed 
balances. When imbalances arose, as they inevitably did, negotiations were re-opened. If the 
talks failed, war usually ensued.  And so was world order, however punctuated by periods of 
great upheaval, fashioned. 
 
From the Congress of Vienna and the Concert of Europe through to the Treaty of Versailles and, 
most recently, to various arms control agreements, the search for international security turned 
on the efforts of diplomats to calibrate and balance power in a manner that produced a workable 
form of equilibrium.  The threat or use of armed force served as the international policy 
instrument of choice and remained the ultimate arbiter in dispute resolution.  For the likes of 
Metternich, Castlereagh, Bismark and Talleyrand, not to mention Churchill, Stalin, and 
Kissinger, power was essentially a function of the ability to compel your adversary to submit to 
your will. Stability was engineered by fine tuning relationships within and between alliances, 
first in a multipolar, and then, following World War II, in a bipolar system dominated by the US 
and USSR. 
  
                                                          
4 The literature on globalization is vast and still growing. For a guided introduction, see David Atkinson, 
“Globalization”, Oxford Bibliographies. Available at: http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-
9780199743292/obo-9780199743292-0009.xml.   
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All of this changed with the implosion of the Soviet Union and the advent of American 
unipolarity in the early 1990s. This was a triumphal, if fleeting moment when history was said to 
have ended and the Washington Consensus of decontrol and market freedom was imposed 
wherever it was not embraced. For large corporations, financial entrepreneurs, those with 
surplus capital, and more than a few felons, these were halcyon days. But nothing lasts forever. 
By the autumn of 2008, with the global economy heading into the worst recession since the 
1930s, it had become clear that the one size fits all prescription of wholesale privatization, 
marketization, decontrol and deregulation was not going to end well. That realization, in 
conjunction with a string of disastrous strategic choices in Afghanistan and Iraq,5 resulted in the 
end of American hegemony.  
 
Today, new poles are rising and America’s prestige and influence are haemorrhaging.6  
Among the commentariat, and in both the academic and popular press, the mainstream view is 
that today world politics are returning to some kind of a G-Zero7, non-polar8, or, more 
commonly, multipolar dispensation. The prefix multi suggests the renewed existence of multiple 
poles of more or less the same type, as was the case in Europe, for example, in the 19th century. 
From that observation it follows that traditional means can again be used to establish some kind 
of new balance, one based largely upon conventional, and widely-shared beliefs, about the 
nature of power and the use of influence.  
As is so often the case with the received wisdom, however, there are good reasons to doubt this 
proposition.9   
BRAVE NEW McWORLD 
With the advent of globalization, international power and influence have become both highly 
dispersed geographically and highly differentiated in terms of source: hard, soft, smart, and so 
forth.10 The old assumptions no longer hold and previously clear delineations have become 
blurred.  The days when well-acquainted negotiators came together around felt-covered tables 
with similar cards in their hands have gone forever. The very nature of power, its workings and 
its ends have been reconstituted. 
                                                          
5 For a discussion of the rise and fall of counterinsurgency,  see, for instance, Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of 
Patraeus”, Foreign Affairs, January-February 2013. Available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus  
6 Given the continuing high levels of continental integration, this is bad news for Canada. On the USA’s international 
image and reputation, see Richard Wike, “From Hyperpower to Declining Power”, Pew Research Global Attitudes 
Project, 07 September 2011. Available at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/09/07/from-hyperpower-to-declining-
power/ . While the USA remains the world’s leading power by most every measure, its relative position is slipping in 
most areas except defence; within a few decades, it seems poised to become the world’s Praetorian pole.     
7 See Ian Bremmer, Every Nation for Itself: Winners and Losers in a G-Zero World (New York: Portfolio, 2012). A 
summary is available in “Welcome to the New world Disorder”, Foreign Policy, 14 May 2012. Available at: 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/14/welcome_to_the_new_world_order.  
8 See Richard Haas, “The Age of Nonpolarity”, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2008. Available at: 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63397/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.  
9 Charles Kupchan, in his book No One’s World (New York, Oxford UP, 2012) has reached broadly similar 
conclusions. For a summary, see “Why Nobody Will Dominate the 21st Century”, HuffPost, 04 April 2012. Available 
at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/charles-kupchan/why-nobody-will-dominate-_b_1426167.html.  
10 See Joseph Nye, Address on “Smart Power” to the AIIA , 11 June 2012. Available at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K3sLkLbmsuU.   
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Like the obsolete formulation of First, Second and Third worlds, most thoughts of great, middle 
and small powers are best set aside, if not forgotten.  States themselves are of diminishing 
importance; while still significant, they now represent only one actor among many on a world 
stage now crowded with multinational corporations, NGOs, think tanks and celebrities.11 Private 
philanthropy and remittances are displacing official development assistance; the Gates 
Foundation is spending more on HIV/AIDS research than most national governments. Given 
such numerous and varied units of international political agency and accounting, an entirely 
new way of seeing will be essential if our understanding is to be enlarged.    
To be sure, and as was the case with the earlier multipolar world, there will again be many poles. 
But this time around, divergent objectives rather than stability and shared goals will be the 
hallmarks. Differences between poles will far outweigh the similarities; today’s main players 
share little in common.   
 
Major new poles – China, India, and Brazil – are forming, while older poles – the USA, Russia, 
and the EU – are evolving, often in new or unpredictable ways.12 And heteropoles are forming in 
all shapes and sizes. Certain countries, such as Turkey, Iran, South Africa and Mexico, as well as 
regions, such as Southeast Asia and the Gulf states, will almost certainly figure in this new 
dispensation.  Moreover, because economic activity, culture, social classes and political space 
have become increasingly transnational and de-territorialized, some of the emerging poles will 
not consist of countries at all - they may be supranational, sub-national, private sector, or 
related in some way to civil society. Some of the emerging heteropoles will be corporations, 
multilateral institutions or cities13 rather than states or regions.   
 
Unlike in previous eras, the heterogeneous quality of the power wielded by today’s competing 
actors renders comparison difficult and measurement even more so.  
Complicating matters further, in an age when networks and connectivity are ascendant, 
perception can trump reality. 
What to do when international policy assets are no longer comparable or compatible?  
Start talking. 
AN OPENING FOR DIPLOMACY 
In the heteropolitan world under construction, security and development will flow not from 
defence, but from diplomacy. That is, diplomacy made smarter, faster, lighter, and more supple. 
Dialogue, negotiation and compromise will be key, as will a capacity to engage in knowledge-
                                                          
11 See Andrew Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2007).   
12 By way of example, and in terms of power sources and specialization, China is becoming the world’s mass market 
manufacturer; India the English-language back office, call centre and software incubator; Brazil the agro-industrial 
voice of the Global South;  Russia the natural resource  superstore; EU the cultural and artistic magnet, and so forth. 
While the descriptions are over-simplified, the point is that with such wide-ranging sources of economic, political, 
military and cultural power, comparison and communication among and between these many and very different poles 
will be challenging.    
13 Cities are particularly under-represented in the still state-centric scheme of things. See Atlantic Council, Foreign 
Policy for an Urban World, 02 August 2013. Available at: http://www.acus.org/publication/foreign-policy-urban-
world-global-governance-and-rise-cities.  
  
Diplomacy, Globalization and Heteropolarity: The Challenge of Adaptation 
by Daryl Copeland 
 
August, 2013 
Page 5 
 
Diplomacy, Globalization and Heteropolarity: 
The Challenge of Adaptation 
based problem-solving, supple analysis and complex balancing. Intelligence generation will be 
central.  
 
How, then, to fix diplomacy, to get from fighting to talking, from diktat to dialogue and from 
coercion to cooperation? The entire “diplomatic ecosystem” will have to be reconstructed from 
the ground up.14 And, like all ecosystems, heightened resilience will flow from increased 
diversity. 
FROM THE CONVENTIONAL TO THE ALTERNATIVE 
The essential elements of diplomatic practice, the majority of which have been in place for 
centuries, must be thoroughly reconsidered. Traditional diplomacy, featuring designated envoys 
engaging mainly in various types of set piece exchanges and transacting the business of 
government, will always have a place. But that domain is shrinking. In advanced democracies 
especially, public and e-diplomacy,15 featuring extensive use of social and digital media,16 has 
become the new centre of activity. Through relationship-building with businesses, academia, 
and think tanks, and by using tools and techniques borrowed from public relations, lobbying 
and advocacy, diplomats can now connect directly with foreign populations and opinion leaders 
with a view to influencing host government policy and decision-making through these partners.  
Convincing host country nationals to share objectives through the power of attraction (soft 
power) represents a sophisticated form of triangulation. It should be of particular appeal to the 
governments of smaller and medium sized countries – like Canada? – who lack the capacity to 
secure international policy outcomes through other means, such as coercion.  
In other contexts, including conflict zones, civil emergencies, or natural disasters – not to 
mention in the barrio, souk or favella – even more unconventional, fleet-footed and innovative 
approaches will be required.17 The main point here is that given the fast-breaking demands of 
globalization and heteropolarity, simply making a demarche and awaiting instructions from 
headquarters is no longer enough. Mastery of both new and conventional media, plus relentless 
innovation and experimentation will be essential.18 
FROM VERTICAL TO HORIZONTAL 
In tandem with the movement of diplomacy away from state-centricity and the Gutenberg 
galaxy into civil society, cyberspace and beyond, the foreign ministry must be re-imagined.19 
                                                          
14 Foreign ministries most everywhere are reaching this conclusion. See, for example, Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations, Modernizing Dutch Diplomacy, Spring, 2013. Available at: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/modernising-dutch-diplomacy; UK House of Commons, The Role of the FCO 
in UK Government, 12 May 2011. Available at: http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-
z/commons-select/foreign-affairs-committee/inquiries1/the-role-of-the-fco-in-uk-government/ ; U.S. Department of 
State, Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (2010). Available at: http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/.       
15 For a good overview of public diplomacy (PD) today, see web site and blog maintained by the University of Southern 
California’s Center on Public diplomacy, available at: http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/.  
16 For an analysis with particular emphasis on Canadian under-performance in this critical area, see Roland Paris, 
“The Digital Diplomacy Revolution: Why is Canada Lagging Behind”, CDFAI Policy Papers, June 2013. Available at: 
http://www.cdfai.org/idevicepapers/DigitalDiplomacyRevolution.htm. See also Daryl Copeland, “Virtuality and 
Foreign Ministries”, Canadian Foreign Policy, 15:2, Summer, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.guerrilladiplomacy.com/wp-content/uploads/Virtuality-final.pdf.  
17 I have written extensively on this theme; see www.guerrilladiplomacy.com.  
18 Former UK diplomat Carne Ross, founder of the NGO Independent Diplomat, has taken diplomatic practice outside 
of government entirely. See  http://www.independentdiplomat.org/. 
19 The urgent need to reform foreign ministries has been clear for at least a decade.  See, for instance, Shaun Riordan, 
The New Diplomacy (London: Polity, 2003).  For a contemporary analysis, see Brian Hocking et. al., “Whither 
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Foreign ministries are typically among the oldest departments of government. Tradition-bound 
and change-resistant, the institutional home of diplomats and diplomacy tends to be rigid and 
hierarchic. Silo-like organizational structures, authoritarian social relations and a heavy reliance 
upon established forms of interaction and patterned responses still dominate. Inherently 
conservative, most foreign ministries are struggling to bring their values and procedures into 
line with the demands of the laterally-connected workplaces of the 21st century.  
With executive branches of government, specialized line departments, and other international 
policy actors playing an ever-larger role, foreign ministries must learn to become smarter, more 
lithe and more supple. Headquarters operations might be smaller, but provided with adequate 
resources the quality of working life could be improved substantially. Costly turf wars and 
competition for leadership on particular files could usefully be left behind in favour of a new, 
more strategic mandate intended to ensure international policy coherence across government. 
Redesigned as a central agency located at the intellectual nexus of thinking about security and 
development, the foreign ministry would operate at a higher level of analysis than is the case at 
present. Core responsibilities, in addition to bi- and multilateral relations, would include the 
articulation of grand strategy20 and the management of globalization and heteropolarity. At 
home, this would entail engagement on a range of cross-cutting, inter-sectoral, whole-of-
government issues such as trade policy and the promotion of democracy and human rights, good 
governance, and the rule of law. Abroad, it would mean experimenting with new forms of 
representation ranging from hub and spoke arrangements, to co-location with like-minded 
parties, to temporary accommodation. In some instances, a diplomatic mission could be 
portable and without lingering overheads: a brass plaque on a hotel room door, coupled with 
secure laptop communications.  
The vital connection to place is the asset which constitutes the foreign ministry’s comparative 
advantage vis-a-vis other government departments. That attribute should be reinforced through 
the deployment of more staff to an enlarged network of missions abroad. But that 
representational footprint would have to be less standardized and cookie-cutter like, more fluid 
and customized, designed in response to specific conditions on the ground.  
 
FROM OLD SCHOOL TO NEW AGE 
Finally, the Foreign Service, the occupational group that represents the human face of the 
profession, will have to be re-invented.21 As is so often the case with matters of personnel policy 
and administration, however, the process of building a better diplomat, and of transforming the 
diplomatic corps is likely to be fraught.  
 
Most foreign services do not typically reflect the demography of the national populations they 
serve. As a result of something akin to corporate cloning, women and visible minorities, among 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World”, Clingendael Policy Brief, April 2013. Available at: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/whither-foreign-ministries-post-western-world.    
20 For an overview of current thinking on grand strategy, see Peter Feaver, “What is grand strategy and why do we 
need it?”, Foreign Policy, 08 April 2009. Available at: 
http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/04/08/what_is_grand_strategy_and_why_do_we_need_it . 
21 Of the three main elements which constitute the diplomatic ecosystem, the Foreign Service has received the least 
attention. For an historical overview of the Canadian case, see Terrance Storms, “The Decline & Fall of the Foreign 
Service, Dorchester Review, 13 June 2013. Available at: http://www.dorchesterreview.ca/2013/06/13/the-decline-
fall-of-the-foreign-service/.    
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others, are often under-represented. Although some external assistance might be necessary in 
the search to find a suitable balance between the principles of merit and equity, this issue could 
be addressed through programs of affirmative action in recruiting and promotion.  
Perhaps even more troubling, the particular mix of skills, background and experience typical of 
many serving and, especially, senior diplomats is not well suited to the requirements of the 
contemporary operating environment. Territorial and ideological issues have in large part given 
way to transnational challenges, many of which – climate change, diminishing biodiversity, and 
resource scarcity – are rooted in science and driven by technology.22   
How many serving envoys are sufficiently literate in these areas? Too few.  
While formal knowledge and impressive credentials are not without value, life skills, such as 
cross-cultural communication, practical problem-solving, self-reliance, resilience and 
improvisation, are of at least equal importance in today’s sprawling diplomatic milieu. Abilities 
and attributes acquired through independent world travel or grass roots volunteer work may 
prove at least as important as years spent in the finest Ivy League universities.  
How many senior diplomats began their careers as backpackers? Not many. 
Foreign services need a cultural revolution, featuring the encouragement of risk tolerance, 
innovation and dissent, an emphasis on continuous learning, and the provision of more 
opportunities for training and professional development. Failure would be assessed as a 
learning experience rather than a career catastrophe. Active secondment and exchange 
programs with other government departments, NGOs, universities, think tanks and business 
would be used to ventilate the ranks by bringing the outside in and turning the inside out. To 
ensure traction, promotion to the executive level would be made contingent upon the successful 
completion of such an assignment.  
 
TURNING THE PAGE 
In the roiling precincts of the heteropolis, diplomats must be more than international policy 
bureaucrats, comfortable organizing visits, writing reports and talking to each other about what 
might be going on outside the chancellery, but disinclined to find out personally. Part street-
smart policy entrepreneur, part tech-savvy analyst, and part network activist, today’s Foreign 
Service Officer needs the aptitudes and temperament of a guide and interpreter, a knowledge 
broker and a nation brand manager.23 He or she will enjoy swimming like a fish in the sea of the 
people, and will never be seen flopping around like a fish out of water when outside the embassy 
compound. Whether it is image projection or reputation management, engagement in 
meaningful dialogue with partners, or negotiating joint ventures with civil society, the new 
diplomat will be able to do whatever it takes to advocate policies, pursue interests, and promote 
values. The encouragement of greater country and regional specialization through education, 
professional development, and a more targeted assignment process would be a good place to 
start.  
 
                                                          
22 See Daryl Copeland, “Science Diplomacy: What’s It All About?” CIPS Policy Brief, 19 November 2011. Available at: 
http://cips.uottawa.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/Copeland-Policy-Brief-Nov-11-5.pdf. 
23 Simon Anholt has done pioneering work on nation branding.  See: 
http://www.gfkamerica.com/practice_areas/roper_pam/placebranding/nbi/index.en.html   
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While the best diplomats are indeed a special breed, the Foreign Service is not a priesthood, and 
the foreign ministry is not a cathedral. These institutions must be made more open, accessible 
to, and valued by their domestic constituencies. Unless and until diplomatic practice, foreign 
services and foreign ministries can better adapt to the challenges posed by globalization and 
heteropolarity, and in so doing demonstrate their competence, relevance and effectiveness, the 
prognosis will remain grim. 
If the diplomatic prospect is to be restored, the status quo is not an option.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA 
With its multicultural cities and large diaspora populations, and given the importance of trade, 
foreign investment, immigration, travel and tourism, Canada is in many respects the 
globalization nation.  This country needs to find its place in the heteropolar world; a failure to 
act would add to this country’s accumulated diplomatic deficit.24  
 
For those reasons and more, the observations outlined over the preceding pages should resonate 
with particular clarity and force in Ottawa.  
Yet all three elements of Canada’s diplomatic ecosystem are at present on life support: 
Diplomacy. Centralized control over all messaging and public communications,25 
unprecedented in the Canadian public service, has ended most unscripted conversations and 
hence crippled diplomatic practice. Because all substantive content must be cleared in advance 
by the political centre, even the most routine advocacy and outreach activities have been 
eliminated. Muzzling employees means that confidence, trust and respect, qualities that serve as 
the bedrock of diplomacy, are no longer in evidence.  From a position of international leadership 
in public diplomacy a decade ago, this country is now effectively out of the race.26  
Foreign ministry. Canada has not undertaken a serious organizational reappraisal since the ill-
fated separation/re-integration of the foreign and trade ministries in 2004-06.27 Reminiscent of 
that disastrous exercise, last spring’s decision to merge DFAIT and CIDA was not shared with 
senior officials in either department until a few hours prior to its announcement. Whatever its 
virtues as regards the goal of policy coherence, news of the unanticipated amalgamation arrived 
at a time when DFAIT was still reeling under the impact of $168 million in cuts contained in the 
federal budget of March, 2012.28 This “double whammy” has imposed such onerous managerial 
and administrative overheads on the new DFATD that long-term planning has become difficult, 
if not impossible.  
Foreign Service. At the time of writing, the government and the Professional Association of 
Foreign Service Officers (PAFSO) are embroiled in a particularly bitter, protracted and 
                                                          
24 For a detailed account of Canada’s diplomatic decline over the past few decades, see Daryl Copeland, “Once Were 
Diplomats: Can Canadian Internationalism Be Rekindled?”, Heather Smith and Claire Turenne Sjolander (eds.) 
Canada in the World (Toronto: Oxford UP, 2013). 
25 See Jeffery Simpson, “The price we pay for a government of fear”, Globe and Mail, (08 June 2010). Available at: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/the-price-we-pay-for-a-government-of-fear/article4321677/.   
26 For a wide-ranging critique of Canadian performance and a remedial prescription, see  Paul Heinbecker, Getting 
Back in the Game: A Foreign Policy Playbook for Canada (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2010). 
27 On the ill-starred FAC21 enterprise, see Daryl Copeland, “A foreign ministry for the 21st century?”, Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal, 19:1, 2013.   
28 See Daryl Copeland, “The Incredible Shrinking Canada”, Guerrilla Diplomacy Blog, 01 April 2012. Available at: 
http://www.guerrilladiplomacy.com/2012/04/the-incredible-shrinking-canada/ . 
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disruptive labour dispute.29 Canadian interests are suffering, especially in the business, tourism 
and education sectors as a result of significant delays in visa issuance. In the fiercely competitive 
environment for commercial opportunities, students, and visitors, those costs will accumulate 
and endure. They are all the more unacceptable because the government could address the 
union's pay equity grievance for a little over $3 million, which is minimal. PAFSO has launched 
a bad faith bargaining complaint against the employer at the Public Service Labour Relations 
Board, but that may take months to resolve.  
Recommendations?  The comprehensive reforms set out in this essay may be necessary, but will 
not be sufficient to turn things around in the short term. Immediate measures should include: 
1. Lifting the extraordinary communications controls, and a full return to best practices in 
public and digital diplomacy. 
2. Initiating a comprehensive review of the foreign ministry’s mandate and operations. 
3. Settling the foreign service strike, either through a return to the bargaining process or by 
recourse to unconditional and binding arbitration. 
CONCLUSION 
Once widely admired for its innovative leadership and internationalist activism, Canadian 
diplomacy is today unable to deliver election to the UN Security Council and instead attracts 
Fossil of the Year awards.  With underused diplomatic capacity and even larger potential, 
Canada can, and must, do better.  
 
We will never be able to achieve our most important international policy objectives through the 
use of armed force; priorities and resources should be reallocated accordingly.  
To ensure that this reinvestment produces a successful outcome, the adaptation of diplomacy to 
the exigencies of globalization and heteropolarity has become imperative. 
                                                          
29  The diplomats’ case is compelling, while the behavior of their employer has been cavalier, if not contemptuous.  
See Derek Burney and Fen Hampson, “For PAFSO, a question of equity and respect”, iPolitics, 15 July 2013. Available 
at: http://www.ipolitics.ca/2013/07/15/for-pafso-a-question-of-equity-and-respect/.  
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